Security and privacy
An email client reads messages written by strangers every day. Vortex Mail is built for that: nothing a message contains runs on your computer, your passwords stay in your system’s keyring, and nothing is sent to its publisher. Each point below links to the public document and the code that back it up.
Vortex Mail is an email client with security features, not an end-to-end encrypted mail service: your messages travel and are stored by your mail providers, as with any other client.
Messages shown without scripts
Each message opens in an isolated frame where no script can run. Remote images, often used to know whether you read a message, stay blocked until you click “Show images”; even then, they are downloaded by the application and never point to your local network.
Proof: threat model · ReadingPane.tsx
Misleading links flagged
A link is never followed inside the message: it opens in your browser. When the text of a link shows a different site from its real address, Vortex Mail warns you before you go.
Proof: threat model · links.ts
Dangerous attachments kept at a distance
Only common documents (PDF, images, text, office documents) open directly. Everything else is saved to your Downloads folder instead of being run. The real type of a file is checked from its content, so a program disguised as a PDF is recognised, and misleading names (hidden characters, reversed text) are cleaned.
Proof: threat model · attachments.rs
Unverified senders flagged
When your provider’s server reports that a message failed its sender checks (SPF, DKIM, DMARC), Vortex Mail shows an “Unverified sender” banner above it.
Proof: threat model · authres.rs
S/MIME: sign, verify, encrypt
Received signatures are checked: trusted authority for mail, signer’s address, message changed after signing. You can sign your messages, read encrypted ones and send encrypted messages to correspondents whose certificate you have. An encrypted message is decrypted in memory only; nothing is written in plain text on disk.
Proof: threat model · crates/smime
Your data encrypted on your computer
The local copy of your mail is encrypted (SQLCipher, AES-256) with a key kept in your system’s keyring. Passwords and sign-in tokens never go into a plain file: they live in the keyring (Secret Service on Linux, the Windows credential store) or, in the portable version, in a vault protected by your master password. Configuration backups are encrypted too.
Proof: threat model · cache.rs · crypto.rs
Secure connections, no silent fallback
Everything that carries a password or a message goes over TLS 1.2 or later. If a server does not offer encryption, the connection fails instead of falling back to plain text; an unencrypted connection only exists if you choose it explicitly. Gmail and Outlook.com sign-in goes through your browser, so Vortex Mail never sees those passwords.
Proof: threat model · transport.rs
No Vortex Mail server, no telemetry
The application talks directly to your providers’ servers. There is no account to create, no ads, no analytics: the publisher receives none of your data. Details in the privacy policy.
How it is checked
- A public threat model lists what Vortex Mail protects, against whom, and with which code. A claim the code does not hold is treated as a defect.
- Automated checks run on every change: blocking static analysis, known vulnerabilities in dependencies, and a regression corpus of booby-trapped messages.
- Every parser of outside input (messages, invitations, server responses, backups, S/MIME) is fuzzed: fed huge numbers of random inputs to find crashes.
- The Rust code of every batch of work is reviewed, and the project has had independent reviews; each finding gets its fix.
- Releases are built from the public source code by GitHub Actions, with checksums signed by the release key: see how to check a download.
What Vortex Mail does not protect against
- A malicious program running under your user account can read the keyring, and therefore the cache and your passwords.
- Sender checks rely on your provider’s server: a sender writing from a look-alike domain is not flagged.
- An S/MIME encrypted message leaves its subject, sender and recipients readable. OpenPGP is not supported.
- Once you show the images of a message, their host learns your IP address and the time.
- Settings, sorting rules and signatures are stored unencrypted.
- Windows files are not signed yet: Windows shows a warning on first install.
The full list is in the known limits of the threat model.
Found a security problem? Report it privately through GitHub or the contact form, never in a public issue. Details in the security policy.